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INTRODUCTION
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently con-
structed a new roadblock to consumer access to generic drugs by nar-
rowly construing the patent carve-out exception to the identical drug
labeling requirement. Generic drug manufacturers often wait until a
brand-name drug manufacturer's (or pioneer's) patent on the com-
position of its drug is about to expire before applying for FDA ap-
proval of the generic drug, so as to avoid patent infringement. As a
result of the latest obstacle, however, generic drug manufacturers may
still be susceptible after the patent on the drug's composition expires
to patent infringement lawsuits based on active patents that cover lan-
guage on the drug label.
Consider the following scenario.' The pioneer's patent on the
composition of its brand-name drug is about to expire, so a generic
drug manufacturer applies for FDA approval to sell the generic drug.
As required by law, the generic label is the same as the brand-name
drug label, which reads in pertinent part, "take with orange juice."
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at 8, 9, available at http://www.fr.com/news/dniglabels.pdf.
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Upon notification of the generic drug application, the pioneer in-
forms the generic drug company of the pioneer's active patent on a
method for administering the drug with vitamin C, a vitamin found in
orange juice. The generic drug manufacturer realizes its susceptibility
to a patent infringement lawsuit because the generic drug label's in-
struction "take with orange juice" induces others (i.e., doctors and pa-
tients) to infringe the pioneer's patent on the method of administer-
ing the drug with vitamin C.
Rather than expose itself to a lawsuit for patent infringement, the
generic drug manufacturer requests that the FDA make an exception
to the identical labeling requirement and allow the patent-protected
"take with orange juice" instruction to be deleted from the label as a
patent carve-out. In its request, the generic drug company argues that
the labeling instruction "take with orange juice" can be deleted with-
out making the drug less safe or effective.
In the past, the FDA may have entertained the generic drug com-
pany's request and evaluated whether the patent carve-out would ren-
der the drug less safe or effective than the brand-name drug with its
label. Recently, however, the FDA decided to limit the patent carve-
out exception to patents in the Orange Book, a listing of patents that
pertain to the listed drugs or their methods of use.2 The Orange Book
may not always contain patents claiming drug labeling information,
such as "take with orange juice," leaving the generic drug company
with two options: litigate or wait until the method patent expires.3
Either way, consumer access to the generic drug is delayed.
Part I of this Comment discusses the development of the Orange
Book restriction on the patent carve-out exception. Part II analyzes
two current controversies involving old antibiotics and biological
products that have arisen from the Orange Book limitation on the pat-
ent carve-out exception. Part III investigates whether limiting the
scope of the patent carve-out to Orange Book listings is consistent with
2 See id. at 11 (explaining that the "labeling language sought to be carved out must
be identified as deriving from a patent listed in the Orange Book"). The Orange Book is
the common name for the FDA publication entitled "Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations." See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH
(CDER), FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUcTs WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUA-
TIONS (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/orange/obannual.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ORANGE BOOK].
3 Mahn, supra note 1, at 11 (noting the "many types of patent claims that can pro-
tect language on drug labels that never appear in the Orange Book," including patents
that claim manufacturing of the drug, verification of homogeneity or strength, or
packaging).
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the statutory language, legislative history, relevant case law, and the
FDA's administrative record and agency decisions. Finally, Part IV
proposes and evaluates alternative mechanisms that the FDA can em-
ploy to establish the appropriate scope of the patent carve-out excep-
tion.
I. THE ORANGE BOOK RESTRICTION ON PATENT CARVE-OUTS
Concerned with the cost of healthcare, Congress granted the FDA
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations that will provide
healthcare consumers with cheaper, generic drugs.4 The overwhelm-
ing administrative costs of creating this complex and intricate regula-
tory scheme have motivated a number of policy decisions that impose
burdens on the generic drug applicants instead of on the FDA. Occa-
sionally, the costs to the drug applicant outweigh the benefits of ad-
ministrative efficiency. One such instance may be the FDA's decision
to limit the scope of the patent carve-out exception to the identical
labeling requirement.
The FDA generally requires the generic drug applicant to have
the same labeling as the pioneer drug. The generic drug applicant
may, however, request to omit language from the label if the language
derives from a patent listed in the Orange Book. This Orange Book list-
ing requirement eases the administrative burden on the FDA, because
the agency need not review patents outside the Orange Book. The limi-
tation may burden the generic applicants in ways not intended by
Congress, however. To analyze the development and implications of
the Orange Book restriction, Part L.A explains the legislation from
which the FDA's authority derives; Part I.B discusses the exceptions to
the identical labeling requirement; Part I.C fleshes out the impact of
the Orange Book restriction on those exceptions; and Part I.D covers
the results of a specific aspect of the Orange Book limitation based on
use codes.
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act
In 1984, Congress passed a complex set of amendments to the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) that significantly changed the
4 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) provides the FDA with general
rulemaking power pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a) (2000).
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process of approving both new and generic drugs.5 Those amend-
ments, known generally as the Hatch-Waxman Act (the Act), used
both patent and food and drug laws to strike "a balance between two
competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and de-
velopment of new drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-
cost, generic copies of those drugs to market., 6 Congress wanted to
expedite the process by which generics bring cheaper drugs to market
while still creating incentives for pioneers to devote resources to re-
search and development of new drugs. 7 Accordingly, the Act provides
pioneers with a limited extension of their patent terms' and the ge-
nerics with a shortened FDA approval process.9
The Act offers three possible mechanisms by which a drug may se-
cure FDA approval and reach the U.S. market: (1) a new drug appli-
cation (NDA), (2) an abbreviated NDA (ANDA), or (3) a section
505(b) (2) application. The first pathway, the NDA, is used by a pio-
neer who wants to produce and sell a new drug for a particular use.10
The NDA is a lengthy document that includes, inter alia, safety and
efficacy information, composition data, and substantial testing."
Along with the NDA, the pioneer must also submit patent information
for "any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submit-
ted the application or which claims a method of using such drug."
12
The FDA then publishes the patent information, along with patent
expiration dates, in the Orange Book, to give notice to future generic
5 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in pertinent part at 21 U.S.C. § 355
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
6 Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also
AAIPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting the descrip-
tion in Andrx of the balance struck by the Hatch-Waxman Act).
7 See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15 (1984), repMnted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2647-48 (explaining the two-fold purpose of the Act: (1) "to make available
more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for
pioneer drugs" and (2) "to create a new incentive for increased expenditures for re-
search and development of certain products which are subject to premarket govern-
mental approval" by granting "restoration of some of the time lost on patent life while
the product is awaiting pre-market approval").
8 See21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (3) (E) (ii) (Supp. IV 2004) (providing a five-year exclusivity
period for successful new drug applications (NDAs)).
9 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000) (describing the requirements for an abbreviated
new drug application (ANDA)).
10 See id. § 355(a) (explaining the "[n]ecessity of effective approval of applica-
tion").
11 See id. § 355(b) (outlining the filing and content requirements of an NDA).
12 Id. § 355(b)(1).
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drug applicants that the patent may block introduction of generic
products.
The Act relieves a generic, however, of the requirement to submit
its own costly testing information to prove the safety and efficacy of an
already NDA-approved drug. Instead, a generic may use the second
pathway and file an ANDA for the same drug that has been approved
by the FDA. 13 To piggyback on the original NDA, the generic must
demonstrate that its drug product is the "same" as the pioneer drug by
submitting information to show that its product is pharmaceutically
• t14 
( 
• 1
equivalent and bioequivalent' 5 to the pioneer approved drug.
ANDAs are generally filed when a generic manufacturer wishes to du-
plicate an NDA holder's drug product.
As a complement to the ANDA, the Act also implements a third
mechanism, section 505(b) (2), for approved drugs that cannot be
brought under an ANDA.17 Section 505(b) (2) is essentially a hybrid
of an NDA and an ANDA. Under section 505(b) (2), an applicant sub-
mits reports of investigations of safety and effectiveness, but also relies
on data not developed by the applicant. 8 A section 505(b) (2) appli-
cant can either submit an application for a new chemical entity or for
changes to previously approved drugs.' 9 Section 505(b) (2) applica-
tions are meant for new drug products that are innovative or that offer
a new therapeutic benefit or alternative.
13 See id. § 355(j) (1), (2)(A)(v).
14 See CDER, FDA, Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, http://www.fda.gov/cder/
drugsatfda/glossary.htm#P (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (defining pharmaceutical
equivalents as drug products containing the same active ingredient(s), dosage form,
route of administration, and strength or concentration).
15 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (8) (B) (2000) (defining bioequivalent as a pharmaceuti-
cal equivalent whose rate and extent of absorption are not statistically different when
administered to patients or subjects at the same molar dose under similar experimen-
tal conditions).
16 See id. § 355(j) (2) (A) (ii), (iv).
17 See FDCA § 505(b) (2), 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2) (2000); David M. Dudzinski, Reflec-
tions on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for
Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 198-199 (2005) (analyzing section 505(b) as a mechanism for
approval of generic biologics).
18 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2) (2000) (allowing an applicant to rely on investigations
"not conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a
right of reference or use from the person by or for whom the investigations were con-
ducted").
19 Id. Examples of changes that can be made with a section 505(b) (2) filing in-
clude changes in dosage, form, strength, or route of administration. Id.
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For every patent listed in the Orange Book that relates to the NDA-
approved drug, the ANDA or section 505(b) (2) applicant must in-
clude appropriate patent certifications and explain the basis for its be-
lief that the application does not infringe any valid claim of an Orange
Book-listed patent. The applicant may submit one of two types of pos-
sible certifications: (1) a "paragraph" certification explaining that the
patent has not been filed (paragraph I), has expired (paragraph II),
will expire (paragraph III), or is invalid or will not be infringed (para-
graph IV);'o or (2) a "section eight" statement 21 that the patent is a
method-of-use patent that does not claim a use for which the appli-
cant is seeking approval.
If an applicant certifies under paragraph V that a patent is invalid
or will not be infringed, then the applicant is required to notify the
patentee and the NDA holder for the approved drug claimed by the
patent as to why the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
generic product. 22 The patentee and NDA holder then have forty-five
days to review the paragraph V notice, during which time the FDA
23will take no action on the generic filing. If the patentee or NDA
holder files an infringement suit within the forty-five-day period, FDA
approval of the generic application is suspended for up to thirty
months unless the matter is disposed of sooner by a court.2
4
The FDA limits the second type of certification, section eight
statements, to situations where "the labeling for the drug product for
which the applicant is seeking approval does not include any indica-
tions that are covered by the use patent."25  Therefore, a generic
manufacturer filing a section eight statement must request FDA ap-
proval to change the generic drug's labeling instructions to exclude
the patented method of use listed in the Orange Book. Accordingly,
the Act sets up a framework wherein a generic may deviate from the
26
identical labeling requirement with the FDA's approval.
20 Id. § 355(j) (2) (A) (vii).
21 Id. § 355(j) (2)(A) (viii) (requiring a "statement that the method of use patent
does not claim" the use for which the ANDA was submitted).
22 See id. § 355(j) (2) (A) (vii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(a) (2007) (discussing the notice
of certification requirement).
23 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (5) (B) (iii) (Supp. IV 2004); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(f) (2007)
(explaining that the FDA will count the day following the date of receipt of the notice
as the first day of the forty-five-day period).
24 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (5) (B) (iii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(f).
25 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a) (12) (iii) (A) (2007).
26 See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. The section eight statement is just
one type of situation where an applicant may invoke the labeling carve-out exception.
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B. Labeling Carve-Out Exceptions
The FDA has the authority to approve ANDAs and section
505(b) (2) applications that omit labeling carried by the listed drug 7
when such labeling is protected by patent or exclusivity. The Act re-
quires that an ANDA contain "information to show that the conditions
of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling pro-
posed for the new drug have been previously approved for a [listed
drug] .28 The Act also requires that an ANDA contain "information to
show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the
labeling approved for the listed drug.",29 The Act specifies two excep-
tions to this requirement: ANDA labeling may differ from that of the
listed drug because changes from the listed drug were approved pur-
suant to an ANDA suitability petition,3 ° or "because the new drug and
the listed drug are produced or distributed by different manufactur-
231ers."3
The FDA implemented generic labeling regulations that fleshed
out the acceptable labeling differences between the proposed labeling
in the ANDA and NDA as a result of distribution by "different manu-
facturers":
Such differences between the applicant's proposed labeling and labeling
approved for the reference listed drug may include differences in expi-
ration date, formulation, bioavailability, or pharmacokinetics, labeling
revisions made to comply with current FDA labeling guidelines or other
guidance, or omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling protected by
2patent or accorded exclusivity under section 505(j) (4) (D) of the act.
The "omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling protected
by patent" is known generally as the patent carve-out exception to the
identical labeling requirement.
The regulations further provide that to approve an ANDA that
omits an aspect of labeling protected by patent or exclusivity, the FDA
27 A listed drug is defined as a "new drug product that has an effective ap-
proval ... for safety and effectiveness .... Listed drug status is evidenced by the drug
product's identification as a drug with an effective approval in the current edition of
FDA's [Orange Book]." 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2007).
28 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
29 Id. § 355(j)(2) (A) (v).
30 See id. § 355(j)(2)(C) (enabling applicants to file suitability petitions for
changes in "route of administration, dosage form, or strength" that differ from the
listed drug).
31 Id. § 355(j) (2) (A) (v).
3 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a) (8) (iv) (2007) (emphasis added).
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must find that the "differences do not render the proposed drug
product less safe or effective than the listed drug for all remaining,
non-protected conditions of use." Whether omission of protected
information renders a drug less safe and effective is a fact-intensive
inquiry that depends on the specific drug and the labeling at issue.
The seminal case sanctioning the FDA's application of the carve-
out exception, albeit to a nonpatented use that was accorded exclusiv-
ity, is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala (BMS)." In BMS, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the Hatch-
Waxman Act allowed the FDA to approve an ANDA for a generic drug
even though the label of the generic drug would exclude an indica-
tion that appeared on the pioneer drug.)5 Applying the first step of
the Chevron analysis, the court concluded that Congress directly ad-
dressed this issue. 7 In its discussion of congressional intent, the court
cited the legislative history of § 355(j) as "unusually strong support"
for allowing generic labels to exclude indications approved for the
pioneer: "The Report accompanying the House bill expressly noted
that it 'permits an ANDA to be approved for less than all of the indica-
tions for which the listed drug has been approved."'"" Accordingly,
the BMS court held that the Hatch-Waxman Act permits the FDA to
approve an ANDA for a generic drug with labeling that differs from
that of the pioneer drug. 9
Even though the court in BMS upheld the FDA's authority to ap-
prove generic drugs with labeling different from the referenced listed
drug, the courts have not yet spoken to labeling differences resulting
3 Id. § 314.127(a) (7).
34 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
35 See id. at 1499 ("The crux of the dispute is whether 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) (A) (v)
permits the agency to approve an ANDA for a new generic drug even though the label
of the generic product will not include one or more indications that appear on the la-
bel of the pioneer drug upon which the ANDA is based.").
M See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) ("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it admin-
isters, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue .... [I]f the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.").
17 See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 91 F.3d at 1500.
38 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 857, pt. 1, at 21-22 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2654-55).
39 Id. at 1501.
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from information protected by patent. 40 The BMS court specifically
held that the patent carve-out exception applies to an omission of an
indication on the label, 4' but neither the courts nor the FDA have for-
mally addressed how the patent carve-out exception applies to "other
aspect[s] of labeling protected by patent."42 In fact, the FDA's current
policy effectively renders this second half of the patent carve-out ex-• 43
ception virtually meaningless•.
C. The Orange Book Restriction
The FDA has recently limited the patent carve-out exception to
patents listed in the Orange Book.44 According to the FDA's current
policy, a generic manufacturer seeking to carve out patent-protected
language from its label must show, first, that the language derives
from a patent listed in the Orange Book, and, second, that the carve-out
will not "render the proposed drug product less safe or effective than
the listed drug for all remaining, non-protected conditions of use. '' 4'
The Orange Book restriction is a new FDA policy with potentially unin-
tended consequences.
To appreciate the consequences of the Orange Book restriction, it is
important to understand the contents of the Orange Book, how those
contents are regulated, and the Orange Book's purpose. As described
above, 46 every NDA must contain patent information regarding the
40 The FDA recently stated that "[t]he courts have upheld FDA's authority to ap-
prove generic drugs with labeling that omits... information protected by patent."
Decision Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, CDER, FDA, to
Applicant (Mar. 1, 2004) (citing Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d
191 (D.D.C. 2002), affjd, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Purepac did not, however, in-
volve a proposed omission of patented labeling information; rather, the issue in Pure-
pac was whether a section eight statement was appropriate with respect to a listed use
patent that did not cover any approved indication for use of the listed drug. 238 F.
Supp. 2d at 200.
I4 n BMS, the generic sought omission of a supplemental indication on which the
pioneer had obtained three-year exclusivity. 91 F.3d at 1496.
42 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a) (8) (iv) (2007).
43 See infra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Orange
Book restriction on the "other aspect[s] of labeling" language).
44 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining the FDA's current patent carve-out
policy).
40 See id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a) (7) (2007)).
4C See sup/ra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the required patent sub-
missions of an NDA applicant).
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drug for which the applicant seeks approval. Once the FDA ap-
proves an NDA, the applicant then has thirty days to amend its patent
submissions to ensure that they list only those patents "that claim[]
the drug substance (active ingredient), drug product (formulation,,41
and composition), or approved method of use. If the applicant ob-
tains a patent for an approved drug after the FDA accepts the NDA,
the owner must list the new patent information within thirty days after
the patent is issued.49 The FDA lists all of these patent submissions in
an addendum to the Orange Book.5°
Three aspects of the Orange Book are particularly important to un-
derstanding the effect of this restriction on the patent carve-out ex-
ception. First, the Orange Book lists only the following types of patents:
drug substance (active ingredient) patents, drug product (formula-
tion and composition) patents, and method-of-use patents. 1  Impor-
tantly, the Orange Book excludes many other types of patents that per-
tain to a given drug, including patents claiming off-label methods of
use, methods of manufacturing, drug packaging, intermediates, or• 52
metabolites. Moreover, Congress at times may exclude certain types
of otherwise listable patents from the Orange Book. As described be-
low, 3 these unlisted patents may be the subject of bona fide carve-out
requests.
Second, the FDA does not take it upon itself to review the patent
submissions. The duty to ensure that the Orange Book lists patents that
actually claim approved drugs lies with NDA holders.54 That is not to
47 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1) (2000) (requiring the applicant to file "the patent
number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the ap-
plicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug and
with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a
person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the
drug").
'8 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c) (2) (ii) (2007).
49 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (2) (2000).
50 See Patent and Exclusivity Information Addendum: Patent and Exclusivity Lists, in
ORANGE BOOK, supra note 2.
51 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (1) (clarifying the "[p]atents for which information must
be submitted and patents for which information must not be submitted").
52 Id.
53 See infra Parts I.A (discussing the statutory exclusion of patents claiming old
antibiotics from the Orange Book), Il.B (discussing the importance of process patents
for biological generics).
54 See Watson Pharm., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442, 445 (D. Md. 2001) ("In
making its decision to list a patent.., it is entirely appropriate and reasonable for the
FDA to rely on the patentee's declaration as to coverage, and to let the patent in-
fringement issues play out in other, proper arenas .. ").
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say that parties, including ANDA applicants, cannot dispute the accu-
racy or relevance of patent information listed in the Orange Book. The
FDA will relay such complaints about Orange Book listings to NDA
holders, but unless the NDA holder "withdraws or amends its patent
information in response to FDA's request, the agency will not change
the patent information in the list.",5  The FDA views its role with re-
spect to patent listing in the Orange Book as "ministerial" and is unwill-
ing to undertake any kind of review of the submissions by the NDA
holders or the challenges by the generic drug companies. 56 Under
the current patent carve-out framework, the Orange Book listing by the
NDA holder dictates whether a generic can carve out language from
its label.
Third, the FDA does not enforce the penalties for withholding
patents from the Orange Book.57 Section 505(b) (2) allows the FDA
to withdraw its approval for a previously approved drug if the NDA
holder fails to submit relevant patents to the Orange Book. 58 No case
or controversy could be identified, however, where the FDA in-
voked this section. The penalties for improperly listing a patent in
the Orange Book, on the other hand, seem to deter pioneers effec-
tively from "ever-greening" the Orange Book. 9 Since 2003, the NDA
applicant or holder must "verify under penalty of perjury" that its
submission of patent information is "accurate and complete." 60 No
55 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f).
56 See Applications for FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Patent Submission
and Listing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,683 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. § 314) (listing a number of court opinions upholding the ministerial role
of the FDA in patent listings).
57 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 11 (describing the penalty of withdrawing FDA ap-
proval from pioneers who fail to list patents as "draconian... and unlikely to ever be
employed").
58 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (4) (2000) (providing the FDA with the authority to withdraw
approval of a drug if the required patent information "was not filed within thirty days
after the receipt of written notice from the Secretary specifying the failure to file such
information").
59 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 9 (suggesting that the amendments to the Hatch-
Waxman Act by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003 "diminished the versatility of the Orange Book as a tool for delaying generic
entry").
60 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c) (2) (ii) (R) (2007). The FDA cracked down on inappropri-
ate Orange Book submissions after the court in Purepac rejected the agency's reliance on
the regulations and general declaration as a reasonable basis for denying a patent
carve out. See Applications for FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Patent Submis-
sion and Listing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,682 (explaining that the "need for
accurate and detailed information related to the approved methods of use claimed in
the patent being submitted for listing is underscored by the decision in [Purepac]").
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similar avenue of policing exists for patents withheld from the Or-
ange Book.31
The limited types of patents in the Orange Book, the failure of the
FDA to review patent submissions, and the absence of utilized penal-
ties for withholding patents from the Orange Book make the Orange
Book a poorly suited limitation on patent carve-outs. An insufficiently
policed collection of select patents will undeservedly bar generics
from FDA approval-a result that flies in the face of the Act's underly-
ing purpose.
D. The Use Code Requirement
Alongside the Orange Book restriction, the FDA now also requires
generics to identify the specific "use code" in the Orange Book to be
62carved out from the label for all method-of-use patents. The FDA
assigns use codes to method-of-use patents for approved products and
lists them numerically in the Orange Book section on use codes. 63 Ac-
cording to the FDA, the purpose of use codes is to "alert ANDA and
505(b) (2) applicants to the existence of a patent that claims an ap-
proved use. ' '6 Descriptions of the use code are limited to 240 total
characters "[d]ue to the limitations of [the FDA's] database system
and software constraints. ' '65 For instance, the FDA assigned the use
code U-258 to an approved indication for the "treatment of neurode-
generative diseases." 66 The NDA holder provides the FDA with the
exact use code description for publication in the Orange Book.67 The
FDA now requires carve-out requests to correspond to a use code, de-
(l Actions may be brought directly against the FDA under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000), on the grounds that the agency's ac-
tion was arbitrary or capricious or not in accordance with the law. See Andrx Pharm.,
Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]he APA provides an
appropriate mechanism for reviewing the lawfulness of the FDA's action.").
62 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining the FDA's requirement that "Orange
Book carve outs involving use patents can occur only at the 'use code' level").
63 See FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Re-
quirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,683 (describing how use codes are listed and assigned).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See Patent and Exclusivity Information Addendum: Patent and Exclusivity Lists, supra
note 50 (defining the patent use codes).
67 See FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Re-
quirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,677 (asking the NDA holder to give the FDA the "exact
use code description to be published in the Orange Book").
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spite the NDA holder's interest in assigning a broad use code to rele-
vant patents.
The implications of this requirement are best illustrated using an
example. Suppose the FDA approved drug X to treat both Hunting-
ton's disease and Alzheimer's disease. 68 Further assume that the NDA
holder of drug X holds a patent on a method of treating Huntington's
disease with drug X, but the patent on a method of treating Alz-
heimer's disease expired. Pursuant to the NDA holder's request, the
Orange Book lists the Huntington's patent under use code U-258:
treatment of neurodegenerative diseases (perhaps because no use
code for Huntington's disease exists). Suppose a generic submits an
ANDA with a section eight statement requesting approval to treat Alz-
heimer's patients with drug X, but not Huntington's patients. The
generic requests a patent carve-out exception to omit the language on
the label associated with treating solely Huntington's disease, but the
use code broadly encompasses treatment for all neurodegenerative
diseases. The FDA's current patent carve-out policy would deny the
generic its carve-out because omission of the entire use code leaves
the label without any indication. Therefore, the generic will not mar-
ket drug X for Alzheimer's disease, even though the patent expired,
because of the use code limitation on the carve-out policy.
The use code should not restrict the patent carve-out exception
because the purpose of the use code will be skewed, and the use code
does not adequately represent the scope of patents. The purpose of
use codes is to "allow interested parties, including ANDA applicants,
to determine the particular medical uses of brand-name drugs as-
serted by the various use patents listed in the Orange Book.""9 Be-
cause the purpose of use codes is essentially informative, pioneers are
encouraged to be forthright in their listings so that a drug use does
not go unnoticed. By using the use code as a limitation on the patent
carve-out exception, the FDA (inadvertently) motivates pioneers to
strategize in selecting what information to provide. Recall that the
FDA "relies exclusively on the NDA holder's statements regarding a
patent's coverage" to assign the use code to the method of use pat-
68 This example is an adaptation of an example in Mahn, supra note 1, at 12 n.21,
which provides an example of a use code for nausea that does not distinguish between
postoperative and postradiation treatments.
69 Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2002),
affd, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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70
ents. Instead of appropriately assigning the use code, pioneers may
be motivated to assign an extremely broad use code to its method of
use, thereby optimizing patent protection.
According to the FDA, use codes "are not meant to substitute for
the applicant's review of the patent and the approved labeling.,
72
Ironically, the FDA now uses these very same use codes in exactly the
manner the agency cautioned applicants not to use them. The FDA
substitutes the use codes for its own review of the patent and labeling
that the applicant seeks to carve out. This Comment does not suggest
that the FDA should engage in extensive patent review, but the agency
should look into alternative modes of patent carve-out review that ex-
tend beyond use codes.7 3 The benefits of administrative efficiency
gained from use code restrictions do not warrant the costs to the
ANDA or section 505(b) (2) applicants and to the public.
II. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES WITH RESTRICTING PATENT
CARVE-OUTS TO THE ORANGE BOOK
The impact of the Orange Book restriction on the patent carve-out
exception can perhaps be best understood by considering the types of
patents that are excluded from the Orange Book. In at least one in-
stance, Congress has denied Orange Book entry of patents that claim an
74entire category of drugs (e.g., old antibiotics). The FDA has also re-
fused an Orange Book listing to categories of patents (e.g., patents
claiming off-label methods of use, drug packaging, intermediates, or
70 Id. at 198 n.10. The court recognized that the agency's "self-abnegation" as to
patent review "creates the possibility for conflict between NDA holders and ANDA ap-
plicants over the proper scope of a particular use patent." Id. at 205.
71 The Orange Book's purpose is also essentially informative, and the FDA eventu-
ally imposed content restrictions on the Orange Book to reduce the number and types
of patent entries. See CDER, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: LISTED DRUGS, 30-MONTH
STAYS, AND APPROVAL OF ANDAS AND 505(B)(2) APPLICATIONS UNDER HATCH-
WAXMAN, As AMENDED BY THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPROVEMENT AND
MODERNIZATION AcT OF 2003, at 3 (2004) (restricting the types of patents that may be
listed in the Orange Book); cf Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 208 (criticizing the FDA for
assuming that every patent in the Orange Book belongs there).
72 FDA Approval To Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Re-
quirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,683.
73 See infta Part IV (discussing possible solutions that maintain the level of patent
review required of the FDA while ensuring a proper scope to the patent carve-out ex-
ception).
74 See infra Part II.A (describing the FDA's refusal of a patent carve-out for the
drug azithromycin).
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metabolites) even if those patents pertain to Orange Book listed drugs.
75
The exclusion of these manufacturing patents likely affects certain
types of drugs (e.g., biological drugs) more than others (e.g., small
76molecule drugs). In both cases, Congress and the FDA were moti-
vated by the overriding policy interests of bringing cheaper generic
drugs to market and encouraging development of new drugs. Yet, the
patent carve-out restriction to the Orange Book arguably controverts
the intent of the legislature and agency by preventing generics from
coming to market and encouraging research in old drugs. Part II.A
explores the problems encountered by ANDA applicants of unlisted,
generic old antibiotics, and Part II.B discusses the implications of the
Orange Book restriction for biological generics.
A. The Old Antibiotics
Prior to the enactment of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, section 507 of the FDCA7 7 regu-
lated the marketing of antibiotic drugs. As a result, antibiotics were
not eligible for the exclusivity and patent protections afforded to
nonantibiotic drugs under section 505 of the Act. 79 In 1997, Congress
repealed section 507 and subjected antibiotic drug approvals to sec-
tion 505 of the FDCA.8s This revision made antibiotics eligible, for the
first time, for section 505's patent and nonexclusivity provisions.
Section 125 of the FDAMA also contains a transition provision af-
fecting certain "old antibiotics"-antibiotics for which an applicant
75 See infra Part II.B (detailing how a process patent impeded FDA approval of a
carve-out request for the biological drug enoxaparin).
76 See infra Part II.B.
77 21 U.S.C. § 357 (2000).
78 An antibiotic drug is
any drug.., composed wholly or partly of any kind of penicillin, streptomy-
cin, chlortetracycline, chloramphenicol, bacitracin, or any other drug in-
tended for use by man containing any quantity of any chemical substance
which is produced by a micro-organism and which has the capacity to inhibit
or destroy microorganisms in dilute solution.., or any derivative thereof.
CDER, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND REVIEWERS: REPEAL OF SECTION 507 OF THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 4 (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/guidance/2468fnl.pdf [hereinafter REPEAL OF SECTION 507].
79 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3), (j)(5)(B), (j)(5)(D) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (grant-
ing three- and five-year nonpatent exclusivity and the patent listing, certification, and
thirty-month stay procedures to nonantibiotic drugs).
80 See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-115, § 125(b)(1), 111 Stat. 2296, 2325 (1997) (repealing section 507).
166 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW
submitted a marketing application to the FDA prior to repeal of sec-
tion 507.8' The transition provision exempts old antibiotics from the
exclusivity and patent protections otherwise available under section
82505, including patent listing and certification. Therefore, patents
claiming old antibiotics and their methods of use are not eligible for
listing in the Orange Book.
3
The exclusion of patents claiming old antibiotics from the Orange
Book recently led the FDA to refuse a potentially bona fide patent
carve-out from a generic label of azithromycin. Patients use azithro-
mycin to treat certain bacterial infections, such as bronchitis and
pneumonia. 4 Azithromycin is characterized as an old antibiotic, be-
cause the FDA approved Pfizer's NDAs for oral capsules and tablets of
Zithromax (azithromycin) before 1997.85 Therefore, the Orange Book
does not list Pfizer's patents relating to the drug azithromycin and its
methods of use.
Pfizer changed its formulation from capsules to tablets in the mid-
1990s because the "tablets do not have a food effect."86 In a letter ac-
companying its NDA, "Pfizer explained that the tablets are bioequiva-
lent to the capsule formulation and... 'can be taken without regard
to meals. ' ' ' s Upon FDA approval of the tablet formulation, Pfizer de-
cided not to market the capsules. Instead, Pfizer marketed oral tablets
of azithromycin and included the food effect in its drug label. Under
the "Precautions" section of the Zithromax drug label, the "Informa-
tion for Patients" states, "ZITHROMAX tablets and oral suspension
can be taken with or without food."88
81 Id. § 125(d)(2), 111 Stat. at 2325.
82 See REPEAL OF SECTION 507, supra note 78, at 2 (discussing the exemption of all
old antibiotics from the patent listing, patent certification, and exclusivity provisions in
section 505).
8 Id.
84 Pfizer, Drug Label for Zithromax, available at http://media.pfizer.com/
files/products/uspi_zithromax600mg.pdf.
85 See CDER, FDA, Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, http://
Nv.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda (enter search term "Zithromax"; fol-
low "Zithromax" link) (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (revealing that five Zithromax NDAs
were approved prior to 1997).
Determination that Zithromax (Azithromycin) 250 mg-Milligram Oral Capsules
Were Not Withdrawn from Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 70 Fed. Reg.
29,329, 29,329-30 (May 20, 2005).
87 Id. at 29,330.
Pfizer, supra note 84, at 15. Note that this drug label was revised in January
2004.
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Pfizer's patent protection for the drug in the U.S. market expired
in November 2005, coinciding with the emergence of generic prod-
ucts."9 These generics recently became vulnerable to potential patent
litigation as a result of the Patent and Trademark Office's 2006 reissu-
ance of a patent on a "Method of Administering Azithromycin" as-
signed to Pfizer.9° The '889 patent claims "[a]n oral dosage form of
azithromycin ... which comprises azithromycin and a disintegrant,
and which exhibits no adverse food effect."9' Now Pfizer can sue ge-
nerics for inducing infringement 2 of the '889 patent. By including
the phrase "take with or without food" on the azithromycin drug label,
the generic may be guilty of inducing consumers to administer an oral
dosage of azithromcyin without an adverse food effect.
Concerned about potential litigation, one generic requested a
patent carve-out exception from its azithromycin drug label.3" The
generic argued to the FDA that the "take with or without food" in-
struction was superfluous and would be protected by patent if issued.9
4
The FDA did not suggest that the instruction was meaningful, but de-
nied the carve-out nonetheless, "claiming that the agency's hands
were tied by the [FDCA]."'- The FDA did not reach the question of
whether the omission would render the product less safe or effective
than its pioneer counterpart, because the Orange Book did not list the
'889 patent.
A generic's frustration with the FDA's decision regarding
azithromycin is exacerbated by the agency's allowance of patent carve-
89 See CURRENT PATENTS GAZETTE (Apr. 28, 2006) (announcing that "Teva and
Sandoz each launched their generic versions of a tablet formulation of azithromycin in
November 2005").
Jo See U.S. Patent No. 5,605,889 (filed Apr. 9, 1994) (issued Feb. 25, 1997) (initial
patent); U.S. Patent No. RE39,149 (filed Jan. 20, 2005) (issued June 27, 2006) (reis-
sue).
91 U.S. Patent RE39,149 col.23 1.25-29.
92 A person induces infringement by "actively and knowingly aiding and abetting
another's direct infringement" of a patent. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co.,
76 F.3d 1185, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850
F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000) (providing that
"[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer").
93 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 8 (describing the FDA's response to the patent carve
out request of "take with or without food" without specifying that the scenario involved
Pfizer or azithromycin). Mr. Mahn later explained that Pfizer's azithromycin was the
drug discussed in his article. Telephone Interview with Terry G. Mahn, Managing
Principal, Fish & Richardson P.C., in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2006).
94 Mahn, supra note 1, at 8.
95 Id.
168 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
out requests for food effects of other listed drugs. The FDA recently
approved a patent carve-out of labeling information relating to the
bioavailabity of metaxolone when taken with or without food.96 Be-
cause the Orange Book listed the relevant patent by use code, the FDA
proceeded to the safety and efficacy prong. 97 While the FDA's deci-
sion to delete label information on the effect of administering the
drug with or without food depends on the specific facts of that case,
the FDA found that metaxolone was safely and effectively adminis-
tered without the food effect labeling.98 Arguably, the bioavailability
data of metaxolone was equally, if not more, important to safety and
efficacy than the "take with or without food" instruction for azithro-
mycin.' The metaxalone example therefore highlights the potential
inconsistencies in the types of information deleted from labels due to
the Orange Book restriction on the patent carve-out exception.
Depending on how Pfizer and generic drug companies react, the
FDA's refusal even to consider the safety and efficacy of generic old
antibiotics with carved-out labels may impede public access to generic
azithromycin.9 0 This end result presumably diverges from Congress's
intent. In its repeal of section 507, Congress clearly intended for old
antibiotics not to benefit from the patent protections of section 505.10'
Congress limited the patent protections solely to new antibiotics (1) to
speed up the entry of generics for old antibiotics into the marketplace
96 See Decision Letter from GaryJ. Buehler, supra note 40, at I ("[T]he FDA has
determined that labeling corresponding to the use (U-189) listed in [the Orange Book]
for [the listed '128 patent] may be carved out of the metaxalone labeling.").
97 See id. at I (identifying the Orange Book use code and proceeding to address the
question of the drug's safety and efficiency).98 ..
See id. at 4 (finding that the omission of food effect labeling will not render use
of metaxalone less safe or effective).
99 See Citizen Petition of King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at 11-17 (Mar. 18, 2004) (de-
scribing why deletion of the bioavailability information would render metaxalone less
safe and effective). The FDA allowed ANDA applicants to delete the bioavailability in-
formation from the label because of (1) the long history of the safe use without the
bioavailabity information, (2) the isolated placement of the bioavailability data in the
Clinical Pharmacology section of the label, and (3) the lack of information on the
clinical effect of the increased bioavailability of the drug when taken with high fat
meals. See Decision Letter from GaryJ. Buehler, supra note 40.
100 In Eon Labs, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., Eon Labs, a manufacturer of generic Zithromax,
pleaded its belief that Pfizer would assert claims of infringement of the '889 patent
based, in part, on Pfizer's counterclaim against Teva for infringement of the '889 pat-
ent. Eon's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 4-5, Eon Labs, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
No. 05 Civ. 002(LAP), 2005 WL 2848952 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2005)
101 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (describing the CDER's policy toward
patent protections of old antibiotics pursuant to congressional intent).
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and (2) to encourage research and development in new antibiotics to
fight the public health crisis due to antibiotic resistance. 1 02 By forbid-
ding an Orange Book listing of old antibiotics, the Act (inadvertently)
afforded old antibiotics a patent protection that, in some ways, ex-
ceeds the patent protection afforded to other drugs under section
505.
The FDA's refusal to omit the azithromycin "take with or without
food" instruction illustrates how the Orange Book restriction may un-
duly limit the patent carve-out exception. The azithromycin example
is unique; but for its being an old antibiotic, the FDA would have re-
quired Pfizer to list the '889 patent in the Orange Book. The FDA re-
quires NDA holders to list patents claiming methods of administering
drugs, like the '889 patent, in the Orange Book. The FDA also requires
Orange Book listing of patents relating to new antibiotics. However,
many old antibiotics are profitable drugs and not all of their patents
have expired.1°3 Perhaps azithromycin will not remain the only exam-
ple of an old antibiotic with newly enforceable, unlisted patents that
inhibit generics from obtaining labeling carve-outs. 104
B. Biological Products
As mentioned above, 10 5 the Orange Book may not list process-of-
manufacturing patents. 0 6 Generally, such patents are not the subject
of carve-out requests because most patent carve-out requests pertain
to small molecule' 7 drugs. Small molecule drugs are not typically de-
102 See Letter from Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, House Commerce Comm., Rep.
Michael Bilirakis, Chairman, House Commerce Subcomm. on Health & Env't, and
Richard Burr, member of the House Commerce Comm., to Michael A. Friedman,
Lead Deputy Comm'r, FDA (May 21, 1998), reprinted in FDA WEEK, Jan. 28, 2000, at 4
(describing Congress's careful balancing of pioneer and generic interests).
103 See DavidJ. Newman, Gordon M. Cragg & Kenneth M. Snader, Natural Products
as Sources of New Drugs over the Period 1981-2002, 66J. NAT. PROD. 1022, 1025-26 tbl.3
(2003) (listing the generic names for antibacterial drugs, their respective trade names,
and the year they were introduced into the marketplace).
104 If the FDA changes its patent carve-out policy for old antibiotics, azithromycin
might be the only recognized example of the Orange Book restriction's effect. See
Mahn, supra note 1, at 12 n.l 9 ("FDA is in the process of reviewing the patent carve-out
policy for old antibiotics.").
:o5 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
06 In this Comment, "process-of-manufactu-ing patents," also referred to as "proc-
ess patents," will be used generally to include both methods of manufacture and meth-
ods to analyze drug products.
107 As used in this Comment, the term "small molecule" refers to a "discrete
chemical entity that generally would contain no more than fifty nonhydrogen atoms,
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fined by features deriving from methods of manufacture; rather, they
are usually described by their specific, well-defined physical and
chemical properties. For example, the drug label for Zithromax de-
scribes its active ingredient, azithromycin (a small molecule drug), by
its chemical name, molecular formula, molecular weight, and struc-
tural formula.""' Drug labels for small molecules do not typically con-
tain information on methods of manufacture.
In the rare event that an important element of a small molecule is
defined by a patented analytical method, the generic will probably
"design around"' 109 that method. When evaluating sameness, the FDA
requires identity of the pharmacological activity, rather than absolute
chemical identity."0 The methodology to characterize small mole-
cules is so sophisticated that a generic can define the small molecule
using an unprotected method and thereby establish pharmacological
identity. Therefore, the fact that process patents are ineligible for list-
ing in the Orange Book does not substantially thwart generics of small
molecules from reaching the marketplace.
Process patents play more crucial roles, however, in the manufac-
ture and characterization of biological products"'-large, complex
molecules derived from living cells. Due to the nature of their source,
biological therapeutics are heterogeneous mixtures of components
often identified by their manufacturing process. For example, a
most commonly carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, fluorine, chlorine, sulfur, and phosphorus."
Dudzinski, sulra note 17, at 154.
108 See Pfizer, supra note 84.
109 An example of "design around" is the tweaking of an element of a purification
process (i.e., using a different resin in a column) to avoid patented methodology,
while still isolating, purifying, and characterizing a drug product that is the "same" as
that of the pioneer.
110 See Serono Labs. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("We thus
conclude that the statute does not unambiguously require the term 'same as' to be de-
fined as complete chemical identity.").
I In this Comment, the term "biological products" refers broadly to drugs that
are obtained from biological sources, including complex carbohydrate-based, nucleic
acid-based, and protein-based therapeutics, as well as "biologics," which are "viruses,
therapeutic serums, toxins, anti-toxins, or analogous products." Dudzinski, supra note
17, at 147 (quoting Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, Ch. 1378, 32
Stat. 728 (1902)).
112 See id. at 14849 (describing the regulatory focus on manufacturing control as
opposed to control of the final product); see also CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION &
RESEARCH & CDER, FDA, FDA GUIDANCE CONCERNING DEMONSTRATION OF COMPARA-
BILITY OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, INCLUDING THERAPEUTIC BIOTECHNOLOGY-
DERIVED PRODUCTS (1996) ("Because of the limited ability to characterize the identity
and structure and measure the activity of the clinically-active component(s), a biologi-
cal product was often defined by its manufacturing process.").
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biological therapeutic might be defined as "drug X obtained by
chemical process Y and characterized by signature group Z" The "ac-
tive ingredient"1 13 is typically not any one particular type of molecule;
rather, certain "signature aspects" of the composition of molecules de-
fine the drug's biological activity. Process patents, unlisted in the Or-
ange Book, likely claim the parameters that describe biological drugs.
Process patents can therefore delay or inhibit biological generics
from entering the marketplace more often than small molecule ge-
neics. Since the FDA limits carve-out exceptions to Orange Book-listed
patents, the FDA will not approve carve-out exceptions for a generic
biological drug based on a process patent. If the drug label describes
a patented method of manufacture directly (chemical process Yin the
example), then the company applying for FDA approval of a generic
must either challenge the patent or wait until the patent expires, even
if the FDA does not require the method-of-manufacture for sameness.
If the drug label describes a signature characteristic of the drug ob-
tained by a patented method (signature characteristic Z in the exam-
ple), then the generic has another option: it can try to design around
the protected method.
Because pioneers define biological products in terms of the proc-
ess and its associated signatures, generics cannot easily design around
process patents for biological products. Biological therapeutics are
rarely characterized fully. Manufacturers continually develop new
methods of defining the active ingredient, so alternative processes to
identify a certain characteristic are not always available. Furthermore,
pioneers can continually update their drug labels to include new in-
formation about the drug based on newly developed, patented ana-
lytical methods. 
4
Now, if the FDA required new information for sameness, it might
make sense that a company interested in developing a generic version
of the drug would have the formidable task of finding or developing
an alternative method to measure the newly added information on the
drug label. The problem is that the generic must design around the
patented method (or challenge the patent's validity) irrespective of
whether the FDA requires the new characteristic for a sameness de-
113 The FDA defines active ingredient as "any component that is intended to fur-
nish pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease." 21 C.F.R. § 210.3(b) (7) (2007).
114 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 10 ("Indeed, FDA's philosophy always has been the
more labeling information that can be made available to doctors and patients the bet-
ter, provided the information is not misleading.").
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termination. Even if the FDA did not require the signature character-
istics for sameness, an ANDA or section 505(b) (2) applicant still
would have to satisfy the identical labeling requirement (without be-
ing susceptible to patent infringement) and, again, the FDA would
not approve carve-outs for unlisted process patents. Therefore, the
generic really has three options: (1) design around, if possible, (2)
challenge the process patent's validity, or (3) wait until the patent ex-
pires. Even though an ANDA or section 505(b) (2) applicant may suc-
cessfully produce a generic drug that is the "same" as the pioneer
drug without infringing a patented method of manufacture, the ap-
plicant remains susceptible to litigation because its label describes the
patented method of making or signature thereof.
A recent example of a process patent impeding an ANDA appli-
cant from FDA approval of a carve-out request involves a biological
drug called enoxaparin. In 1993, the FDA approved Aventis's NDA
for Lovenox (enoxaparin sodium) to inhibit blood clots.15 Enoxa-
parin is a low molecular weight heparin (LMWH) derived from por-
cine intestinal source heparin.16 A heparin is "composed of a core
protein with a number of linear polysaccharide chains extending from
the protein."" 7 A manufacturer of enoxaparin must break down the
large carbohydrate chains into smaller chains through enzymatic or
chemical depolymerization. "" A complex mixture of sugars comprises
the final product, and which sugar or combination of sugars makes up
the active ingredient is unknown." 9
Because of the difficulty of characterizing biological drugs, the la-
bel for Lovenox describes enoxaparin by its method of manufacture
(i.e., "obtained by alkaline depolymeriziation") and its signature char-
acteristics (i.e., "acid group at the non-reducing end" and "molecular
weight distribution") . Aventis recently added another signature
characteristic, generally known as a "structural fingerprint," to its de-
115 See Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., CDER, to Judith Plon, Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer (Mar. 29, 1993), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/fiolappletter/pre96/
20-1641tr.pdf.
116 See Citizen Petition, Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., at 5 (Feb. 19, 2003) (ex-
plaining the source of enoxaparin and its preparation).
17 Id.
18 See id. at 7 (describing the various depolymerization processes of LMWHs).
l19 See id. at 10-11 (acknowledging that enoxaparin is not "fully characterized").
120 See Aventis, Lovenox Drug Label (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://
www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2000/20164S361bl.pdf.
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scription of enoxaparin.' 2' The new label reads in pertinent part,
"About 20% (ranging between 15% and 25%) of the enoxaparin
structure contains an 1,6 anhydro derivative on the reducing end of
the polysaccharide chain."'2 Around the same time Aventis updated
the Lovenox label with the 1,6 anhydro derivative fingerprint, Aventis
obtained Patent '316, which claims a method of manufacturing poly-
saccharides with a 1,6 anhydro derivative on the chain's reducing
end.123 The Orange Book does not list Patent '316.
Aventis's major patent on Lovenox expired in December of
2004. 14 In 2003, both Amphastar and Teva submitted ANDAs for ge-
neric versions of enoxaparin, which Aventis heavily contests.' 25 In Au-
gust 2005, Momenta, in an exclusive collaboration with Sandoz (ge-
nerics division of Novartis) to jointly develop and commercialize
generic enoxaparin, submitted an ANDA for "technology-enabled" M-
Enoxaparin. 126 Momenta has developed its own technology to analyze
and sequence complex mixtures of sugars.127 According to Momenta,
the technology enables the company to develop a generic version of
enoxaparin that "will demonstrate chemical 'sameness' to Lovenox
and meet the FDA requirements for generic marketing approval."'
28
Momenta's technology does not detect 1,6 anhydro derivatives, how-
ever.
Even if Momenta can prove that its generic M-Enoxaparin is the
same as Lovenox, Aventis will almost certainly sue Momenta for patent
121 See Aventis, Lovenox Drug Label (July 23, 2004), available at http://
www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2004/20164s0551bl.pdf.
122 Id. at 2.
123 U.S. Patent No. 6,617,316 (filed Oct. 20, 2000) (issued Sept. 9, 2003); see also
U.S. Patent No. 6,969,705 (filed July 23, 2001) (issued Nov. 29, 2005) (claiming com-
positions of polysaccharides derived from heparin and their method of preparation).
24 See Feliza Mirasol, Generics To Challenge Lovenox, 268 CHEMICAL MARKET REP.,
Sept. 5-11, 2005, at 28, 28 (noting that "despite the December 2004 expiration of
Lovenox's major patent, the fight has just begun for Sanofi-Aventis").
125 See Citizen Petition, supra note 116 (requesting that "the FDA refrain from ap-
proving any ANDA citing Lovenox® as the reference listed drug unless the manufac-
turing process used to create the generic product is determined to be equivalent to
Aventis' manufacturing process... [or] the generic product contains a 1,6 anhydro
ring structure at the reducing ends of between 15% and 25% of its polysaccharide
chains").
126 Press Release, Momenta, Momenta Pharmaceuticals Announces Abbreviated
New Drug Application Filing for M-Enoxaparin (Aug. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.momentapharma.com/press-releases/ANDA%20Filing.htm.
127 Id.
128 Momenta, Revised Regulatory Fact Sheet, available at http://
www.momentapharma.com/Reg%20Fact%2OSheet.pdf.
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infringement based on the labeling language describing the 1,6 anhy-
dro derivative. Under current analytical technology, Momenta cannot
determine whether M-Enoxaparin has the 1,6 anhydro derivatives-
the structural fingerprint-without infringing Aventis's patent. Yet,
the FDA has not determined that enoxaparin needs the structural fin-
gerprint for a sameness determination.129 Without having demon-
strated that the structural fingerprint actually bears the clinical signifi-
cance necessary for sameness, Aventis has delayed the entry of generic
enoxaparin into the marketplace by implanting process patent lan-
guage into its drug label.
Momenta's hands are further tied because the FDA will not ap-
prove a carve-out request based on an unlisted patent. Regardless of
whether the omission of the language would actually render the drug
less safe or effective, the FDA will deny a carve-out request by Mo-
menta because the Orange Book does not list the patent claiming pro-
duction of enoxaparin with an 1,6 anhydro derivative on its reducing
end. Notably, Aventis was not required to demonstrate to the FDA
that alternative manufacturing processes cannot achieve enoxaparin
that is legally or clinically the "same" as Lovenox. Rather, the FDA
imposes the burden on Momenta to demonstrate that its enoxaparin
possesses Aventis's structural fingerprints. The FDA's current policy
misplaces this burden, especially considering that the FDA may not
even require structural fingerprints for sameness.
The enoxaparin example is a precursor to problems that biologi-
cal generics may incur due to the Orange Book restriction on the patent
carve-out exception. Enoxaparin is an anomaly, however, because
Teva, Amphastar, and Momenta all applied for FDA approval of ge-
neric enoxaparin using ANDAs. Generally, the FDA does not approve
generic biological products via ANDAs for two reasons: (1) the Orange
Book does not list pioneer biological products, and (2) generics can-
not meet the stringent same active ingredient requirement of AN-
DAs . 130 The FDA has approved very few NDAs for biological prod-
129 The FDA could find that generic M-Enoxaparin is the "same" as Lovenox even
though the generic biological product exhibits heterogeneity. The FDA deemed ge-
neric menotropin products to be the same as Perganol, so long as the degree of batch-
to-batch variation in the generic is similar to variation in the reference listed drug. See
Serono Labs. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting the FDA's de-
termination).
130 Generic menotropin is a biological therapeutic approved via an ANDA. Id.
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ucts. 13 In the few instances when the FDA has approved an NDA for a
biological product, the generic applicant has preferred a section
505(b) (2) application, and not an ANDA, 32 though some support
FDA approval of biological generics through section 505(b)(2).1
3
3
Nevertheless, section 505(b) (2) subjects applicants to the same patent
and Orange Book requirements as ANDAs. Therefore, the enoxaparin
example illustrates the arguably negative consequences of the Orange
Book-restricted patent carve-out exception on both ANDA and section
505 (b) (2) applicants of biological generics.
Yet only a handful of biological drugs are currently subject to the
Hatch-Waxman Act. The FDA approves most biological therapeutics,
including glycoproteins and monoclonal antibodies, as biologics via
Biologics License Applications, or BLAs.134 The Public Health Service
Act of 1944 (PHSA) codifies the segregated regulatory system for bio-
logics.135 Currently, no established statutory or regulatory pathway
provides the FDA with the authority to utilize an abbreviated approval
process for generic versions of BLA products. 136 The FDA could, in
theory, "recharacterize BLAs as NDAs" or "interpret Hatch-Waxman
and section 505(b) (2) to authorize a form of abbreviated biologics li-
censing application (ABLA),"'" in which case the labeling sameness
requirement would apply to all biological generics. Realistically, how-
ever, the FDA is probably not going to do much in this area without
direction from Congress.
131 But see Dudzinski, sup-a note 17, at 219 (noting that insulin and human growth
hormone were approved under NDAs).
132 See id. ("The application of section 505(b) (2) to those therapeutic proteins ap-
proved tinder an NDA, like insulin and growth hormone, seems rather noncontrover-
sial....").
133 See id. at 198-220 (analyzing "Section 505(b) (2) as a mechanism for FDA ap-
proval of generic biologics").
B4 In fact, "Aventis questions... whether the generic drug approval model (i.e.,
the ANDA process) is appropriate for [enoxaparin] even though they have officially
fallen tinder CDER'sjurisdiction." Citizen Petition, supra note 116, at 8. Decisions as
to which biological products are approved under NDAs and BLAs have been somewhat
arbitrary over the years. See Dudzinski, supra note 17, at 145-49, 152-54, 158-60, 175-78
(providing a thorough overview of regulatory history in the area of biologics and pro-
tein-based therapeutics).
135 See Public Health Service Act of 1944, 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2000).
See id. (establishing no provision that would permit approval of a follow-on, or
generic, protein product using an abbreviated application, but allowing the Secretary
to prescribe requirements for exceptions).
Dudzinski, supra note 17, at 219-20.
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The next two years should present the FDA with a reasonable op-
portunity to change its patent carve-out policy as applied to biological
products. Congress is currently grappling with the creation of a path-
way for biological generics.1 38 Legislation now moving through Con-
gress may or may not have a labeling sameness requirement, however,
so the patent strategy discussed here may only affect the few albeit
profitable biological drugs approved via NDAs. Regardless of whether
Congress passes legislation using one of the existing pathways or craft-
ing a new pathway for biological generics, the FDA should create new
regulations that contemplate the detrimental impact of the Orange
Book restriction on patent carve-out exceptions in the biological ge-
neric context.
III. LACK OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ORANGE BOOK LIMITATION
In addition to the potentially undesirable consequences of the Or-
ange Book restriction on the patent carve-out exception, the FDA may
not actually have the authority to implement such a restriction. The
text of the Hatch-Waxman Act clearly makes an exception to the iden-
tical labeling requirement for different manufacturers, and, read
alongside the other same labeling exceptions, it provides only one
limitation to that exception: the generic drug must be as safe and ef-
fective as the pioneer drug.139 The legislative history recognizes that
different manufacturers must "design around" the pioneer manufac-
turer and provides a nonexhaustive list of instances where labeling dif-
ferences would be apt, none of which depend on the patent's Orange
Book status.140 The judicial constructions of the Act and its early ad-
ministrative record envision a broad scope for the carve-out excep-
tion. The FDA itself has previously required only that labeling
changes not render the generic drug less safe and effective than the
pioneer drug. 42 This lack of statutory, judicial, and agency support
suggests that the FDA should rethink its approach to the patent carve-
out policy.
138 See Senate Advances Biogenerics Bill, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, July 2,
2007, at 20 (discussing legislation currently before the Judiciary Committee that would
give the FDA authority to approve less-expensive generic versions of biological medi-
cines).
i39 See infra Part III.A.
40 See infra Part III.B.
41 See infra Part III.C-D.
142 See infra Part III.C.
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A. The Text of the Hatch-Waxman Act
The FDA's recent treatment of patent carve-outs arguably conflicts
with the Hatch-Waxman Act. The plain meaning of the different
manufacturer exception does not expressly allow for an Orange Book
restriction on patent carve-out requests. Moreover, the FDA should
consider only safety and efficacy when evaluating a patent carve-out,
so that the agency's treatment of the different manufacturer excep-
tion is internally consistent with its treatment of other labeling excep-
tions in the Act.
The Hatch-Waxman Act makes an exception to the identical label-
ing requirement for instances where the generic manufacturers or dis-
tributors differ from those of the pioneer. The Act requires an ANDA
to provide information showing that the "labeling proposed for the
new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug...
except for changes required because of differences approved under [a
suitability petition] or because the new drug and the listed drug are
produced or distributed by different manufacturers."' 143 The statute
itself provides no further information on how to implement the dif-
ferent manufacturer exception.
At first glance, the different manufacturer exception appears to
swallow the identical labeling requirement. The pioneer and generic
drug manufacturers are typically different entities, so, according to
the plain meaning of the exception, the identical labeling require-
ment does not seem to apply to them. This interpretation of the Act
does not seem reasonable, however, because of the importance of
keeping labels of the same drug nearly identical. Therefore, the dif-
ferent manufacturer exception must be read more narrowly.
One way to interpret the exception more narrowly is to place
more emphasis on which changes in the label are actually required.
The generic manufacturer has the burden to show that its label is
identical to the pioneer's except "for changes required... because the
new drug and the listed drug are produced or distributed by different
manufacturers."' 144 Accordingly, the same labeling requirement does
not apply to "required" changes in labeling information, but the ques-
tion becomes: Which types of changes are "required" because differ-
ent manufacturers produce or distribute the pioneer and generic
drugs? Broadly interpreted, manufacturers could request any number
143 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) (A) (v) (2000).
144 Id. (emphasis added).
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of labeling changes based on differences in production and distribu-
tion, but not all of them will be "required." The statute itself does not
address this question in the context of the different manufacturer ex-
ception.
The Act does, however, address the types of changes required for
the other exception to the identical labeling requirement-
differences approved under a suitability petition. An applicant sub-
mits a suitability petition along with an ANDA for a generic drug
"which has a different active ingredient or whose route of administra-
tion, dosage form, or strength differs from that of a listed drug.",
45
The FDA will approve the petition so long as it finds the drug as "safe
and effective" as the listed drug.14 For suitability petitions, FDA ap-
proval hinges on the safety and effectiveness of the generic drug un-
der the conditions prescribed on its label. Therefore, the "required"
changes under a suitability petition are those changes requested by
the ANDA applicant that do not render the generic drug less safe or
effective than the pioneer drug.
Drawing on the Act's treatment of the other exception (suitability
petitions), the different manufacturer exception should extend to
changes requested by the applicant because of differences in produc-
tion and distribution that do not affect the safety and efficacy of the
drug. This interpretation of the exception makes the Act's treatment
of exceptions to the identical labeling requirement internally consis-
tent. FDA approval of the labeling changes due to different manufac-
turers should therefore depend on whether the FDA deems the ge-
neric drug as safe and effective as the pioneer drug in the context of
its proposed label.
The FDA seemed to agree at one point. Pursuant to the Hatch-
Waxman framework, the FDA had instituted a mechanism for generics
to request patent carve-outs that appeared to revolve solely around the
safety and effectiveness of the generic drug. 47 Under that previous
mechanism, an ANDA applicant proposed a generic product with la-
,45 Id. § 355(j) (2) (C).
46 Id. ("The Secretary shall approve such a petition unless the Secretary finds-(i)
that investigations must be conducted to show the safety and effectiveness of the drug
or of any of its active ingredients, the route of administration, the dosage form, or
strength which differ from the listed drug; or (ii) that any drug with a different active
ingredient may not be adequately evaluated for approval as safe and effective on the
basis of the information required to be submitted in an ANDA.").
147 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(7) (2007) (requiring that omissions of an aspect of
labeling protected by patent "not render the proposed drug product less safe or effec-
tive than the listed drug for all remaining, non-protected conditions of use").
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beling that differs from that of the reference listed drug, and the ap-
plicant argued to the FDA that the proposed labeling rendered the
drug as safe and effective as the concurrently approved labeling of the
listed drug. The FDA then assessed, in the context of an ANDA, the
safety and effectiveness of the generic drug's proposed labeling.
Recently, the FDA departed from its precedent and inserted a pre-
liminary step to the safety and effectiveness evaluation. This step re-
quires that the omitted language derive from an Orange Book-listed
patent. The basis for this restriction is not in the text of the statute it-
self. At best, the statute is silent as to this limitation. At worst, the
limitation does not comport with the statutory provisions that author-
ize the process for generic drug approval.
While no current controversy exists in the courts, an aggrieved
party could, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chal-
lenge an FDA denial of a patent carve-out based on the Orange Book
restriction as being inconsistent with the Hatch-Waxman Act.148 The
aggrieved party would likely argue that there is no reason to believe
on the face of the Hatch-Waxman Act that Congress intended differ-
ences resulting from different manufacturers to be acceptable only
when the differences derive from patents listed in the Orange Book.
The success of this statutory challenge will likely depend on the
court's tools of statutory interpretation and the level of deference
awarded to the FDA. On the one hand, a textualism-centered court
applying a Chevron analysis may find the Hatch-Waxman Act silent or
unambiguous as to the breadth of the different manufacturers' excep-
tion and defer to the FDA. 4 9 On the other hand, a court using other
tools of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history, and defer-
ring to the FDA under Skidmore may find the Orange Book restriction
outside the exception's scope.150
148 According to section 706(2) (C) of the APA, a reviewing court may reverse the
FDA's decision if it is "in excess of statutoryjurisdiction, authority, limitations, or short
of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C) (2000).
149 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
'50 Since the FDA applies the Orange Book restriction in informal adjudications
(i.e., decision letters to individual applicants), the court may apply Chevron or Skidmore
(persuasive) deference to the FDA's interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act. See
United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding that Skidmore, and not Chev-
ron, deference applies to statutory constructions announced in classification ruling let-
ters issued by the Customs Service).
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B. The Legislative History of the Hatch-Waxman Act
While the legislative history of the Act's labeling exceptions is
meager, the comments in the House Report are consistent with a view
that the different manufacturer exception was intended to have a
broad scope. Congress anticipated that generic drug manufacturers
would seek FDA approval of labels that differ from those of the pio-
neer. The House Report explained that "[t]he Committee recognizes
that the proposed labeling for the generic drug may not be exactly the
,,151
same.
The congressional reports condoned specific differences in the
labeling due to different manufacturers as well. For instance, mem-
bers of Congress expected different manufacturers to delete from
their labels information pertaining to an indication for which ap-
proval was not being sought. The report accompanying the House
version of the Hatch-Waxman Act expressly noted that the Act "per-
mits an ANDA to be approved for less than all of the indications for
which the listed drug has been approved."1 52 In BMS, 153 the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court understood the House Report to suggest that Congress re-
garded labeling changes as a necessity for ANDAs accompanied by a
section eight statement.154
The legislative history also lists instances outside of indications
where the proposed labeling for the generic drug may not be exactly
the same as that of the reference listed drug. This list is clearly by way
of example and is not exhaustive. The congressional report provides
"an example" where "the name and address of the manufacturers
would vary as might the expiration dates for the two products."
155
Congress clearly intended the different manufacturer exception to
apply to technical differences between manufacturers, such as names,
addresses, and expiration dates.
The report approves another seemingly technical difference be-
tween manufacturers that is much more indicative of the breadth and
substance of the carve-out exception:
151 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 22 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2655.
152 Id. at 21, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2654.
153 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996); su-
pra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (describing statutory exceptions to
the labeling requirements).
155 H.R. REP. No. 98-857 at 22, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2655.
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Another example is that one color is used in the coating of the listed
drug and another color is used in that of the generic drug. The FDA
might require the listed drug maker to specify the color in its label. The
generic manufacturer, which has used a different color, would have to
specify a different color in its label. 156
While an exception based on different colors between drugs may
seem no more substantive than different names and addresses be-
tween manufacturers, the color specification example implies that the
carve-out exception may extend to differences based on a combina-
tion of FDA requirements and intellectual property law.
Generic drug manufacturers purposefully change the color of ge-
neric drugs to avoid trademark infringement suits. Colors may receive
trademark protection if they possess secondary meaning, so a pioneer
can sue a generic for trademark infringement if the generic drug and
brand-name drug have the same color. 15  Furthermore, if a generic
drug has the same color as the pioneer drug, the pioneer may sue the
generic manufacturer for inducing pharmacists to illegally substitute a
generic drug for the brand-name drug. 158
Congress presumably recognized that generic manufacturers may
need to color their drugs differently from those of the pioneer for in-
tellectual property reasons. 159 Congress also understood that generics
must follow FDA requirements, such as color specifications. There-
fore, the House Report notes a difference in manufacturing (color
changes) necessitated by intellectual property concerns that falls
within the different manufacturer exception. In doing so, the legisla-
tive history supports the extension of the labeling exception to at-
tempts by generics to "design around" the pioneers. Congress appar-
ently intended the different manufacturer exception to broadly
encompass changes in labeling, including those compelled by intellec-
tual property protection.
156 Id.
157 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (holding that
color can be a trademark when the "color has attained 'secondary meaning' and ther-
fore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand").
1 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 846 (1982) (discussing
"the circumstances under which a manufacturer of a generic drug, designed to dupli-
cate the appearance of a similar drug marketed by a competitor under a registered
trademark, can be held vicariously liable for infringement of that trademark by phar-
macists who dispense the generic drug").
159 Notice that Inwood was tried concurrently with the enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.
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A broad reading of the different manufacturer exception is also
consistent with the Act's purpose, as stated in the legislative history of
the Act, to limit the monopolization of certain drugs by brand-name
manufacturers.
[T]he purpose of Title I of the Bill is to make available more low cost
generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for
pioneer drugs ....
The purpose of Title II of the Bill is to create a new incentive for in-
creased expenditures for research and development of certain products
which are subject to premarket government approval. The incentive is
the restoration of some of the time lost on patent life while the product
is awaiting pre-market approval. "'o
The goal to "make available more low cost generic drugs" is furthered
by a broad reading of the different manufacturer exception, and is
both separate and distinct from the incentive for research and devel-
opment-namely, "restoration of some of the time lost on patent life."
The FDA's Orange Book restriction conflicts with both of the stated
purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and would confer substantial ad-
ditional rights on pioneer drug patent owners that Congress quite
clearly did not intend to confer. Diverging from Title I's purpose, an
NDA holder can maintain its exclusivity by exploiting the Orange Book
limitation on the patent carve-out exception in a variety of ways.161
For example, the NDA holder can amend its label to include informa-
tion protected by newly acquired patents.162 Or the NDA holder can
assign a use code that overstates the patent's scope, thereby inhibiting
a generic from obtaining FDA approval for an unprotected indica-
tion.163 In addition, the NDA holder could withhold patents from the
Orange Book to inhibit the FDA from approving carve-outs.6 In all
these cases, the NDA holder can use the Orange Book restriction
against any competitor seeking approval to market an off-patent drug
160 H.R. REP. No. 98-857 at 14-15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647-48.
See Mahn, supra note 1, at 11-12 (describing ways in which NDA holders can
"ever-green" the drug label).
162 See id. at 10 ("[A] potent strategy to 're-protect' a drug that has been 'generi-
cized' might involve filing a patent application with claims specifically designed to ap-
pear on an amended pioneer label.").
163 See supra Part I.D (providing an example where an NDA holder's broad use
code eliminated the carve-out exception for a generic).
164 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 11 ("[P]ioneers have a strong incentive to opt out of
the Orange Book in order to eliminate the carve out option ....").
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for an approved use not covered by a patent. NDA holders can essen-
tially bar generic manufacturers from entering the market, a result
that does not advance the purpose of making available "more low cost
generic drugs."
The Orange Book restriction does not advance the purpose of Title
II of the Hatch-Waxman Act either. Congress explicitly stated that the
incentive created by the Act was patent term restoration, and the Act
describes a detailed protocol to increase "some of the time lost on
patent life." The Orange Book restriction is not the type of incentive
for research and development that Congress had in mind. In fact, the
Orange Book restriction creates a disincentive to perform research and
development that would yield new drugs and new methods of use. 65
Since pioneers can use patent carve-outs as a tool to delay generic
drug entry, they are encouraged to research and develop patentable,
incremental improvements on old drugs that can be added to a drug
label, as opposed to new drugs and methods.166 There is no evidence
that Congress intended the Act to enable a pioneer to extend its ex-
clusivity merely by manipulating entries in the Orange Book and updat-
ing labeling instructions.
Also noteworthy is the lack of support for the Orange Book restric-
tion in the Act's legislative history. Nowhere in the reports did Con-
gress envision limiting the types of features that the generic could "de-
sign around" to features protected by patents in the Orange Book. Also
absent from the legislative history is the suggestion that the FDA
should deny or even delay an ANDA because of an existing patent
claiming some aspect of the labeling that is tangential to the drug's
safety and effectiveness. To the contrary, congressional reports indi-
cate that Congress intended drug labels to reflect differences between
the generic and pioneer drugs, including those stemming from intel-
lectual property concerns.
165 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 12 n.25 ("Restricting patent label carve outs to listed
patents ironically enhances the power of unlisted patents relative to listed patents, as a
tool to monopolize drug marketing. This result would encourage a pioneer to invest
more on the search for minor, albeit patentable improvements that could be used to
protect an aspect of labeling, and less on developing new methods of use and drug
products.").
166 Id.
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C. Agency's Regulations and Rulings
Not only do the statute and legislative history seem to approve of,
or at least not condemn, carve-out requests deriving from unlisted
patents, but the FDA also designed its rules to allow the agency to ap-
prove such requests. When crafting the original labeling regulations
in 1992, the FDA contemplated approval of bona fide carve-out re-
quests besides those included in section eight statements. The admin-
istrative record indicates that the FDA actually changed a draft regula-
tion to specifically condone nonindication carve-out requests derived
from unlisted patents. A 2002 decision from the FDA also demon-
strates that, pursuant to its own rules, the agency approved a carve-out
request deriving from unlisted patents.
The original version of the generic labeling rules proposed by the
FDA specified that only an "omission of an indication protected by
patent" (and not any "other aspect of labeling") was an acceptable dif-
ference in labeling.'G7 A prognostic comment convinced the agency,
however, that the scope of the proposed labeling rule was too narrow.
The comment that struck a chord with the FDA expressed the con-
cern that ANDA applicants may be exposed to litigation based on "a
possible claim of inducement or infringement where a nonapproved,
but patented, method of administration is discussed in the innovator's
label."168 Importantly, the Orange Book does not list patents for "non-
approved" conditions. The FDA "agree [d] in part with the comment"
and, accordingly, amended the provision to include any "other aspect
of labeling protected by patent."169
At least initially, the FDA apparently viewed unlisted patents as a
bona fide source of information to be carved out of a label. And the
amended provision gave the agency flexibility to approve the omission
of language protected by claims of patents ineligible for Orange Book
167 Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872, 28,923
(proposedJuly 10, 1989).
168Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,962
(Apr. 28, 1992). The comment also warned the FDA that the proposed rules did not
account for instances in which the "labeling refers to more than one method of use
and 'some but fewer than all of the methods of use are entitled to nonpatent exclusiv-
ity."' Id.
169 Id. The FDA did not specify the part of the comment with which it agreed, but
the amendment allows the agency to extend the different manufacturer exception in
both instances. Id.
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listing. ' Evidently, the FDA originally supported a broad scope of
the patent carve-out currently contravened by the Orange Book restric-
tion.
The FDA's recent decision to apply the Orange Book requirement
to all carve-out requests (i.e., both "omission of an indication" and
"other aspect[s] of labeling protected by patent") suggests that the
FDA no longer supports a broad exception. The 2003 Modernization
Act strictly limited the types of patents eligible for listing in the Orange
Book, and the FDA apparently believes that this subset of patents is the
only source of bona fide patent carve-outs. The FDA provides no rea-
soning as to why it narrowed the scope of the exception, nor anyjusti-
fication for the change in its approach. In fact, the Orange Book re-
striction and the logic behind it are wholly undocumented.
Furthermore, the FDA's current treatment of patent carve-out re-
quests is both new and inconsistent with previous decisions. In 2002,
the FDA approved labeling changes originating from an unlisted pat-
ent. 7 In its Citizen Petition, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) requested that
the FDA deny ANDAs for crystalline generic cefuroxime axetil, in part•172
because generics could not meet the same labeling requirement.
The package insert for GSK's cefuroxime axetil drug (Ceftin) de-
scribed the active ingredient as being "in the amorphous form.' ' 3
GSK contended that "approving a drug product wholly or partially
composed of the crystalline form of cefuroxime axetil would flout the
requirement that the labeling of an ANDA product be the same as
that of the reference listed drug." 174 The FDA rejected GSK's argu-
ment and approved the labeling changes proposed by ANDA appli-
cants: "Consistent with this regulatory scheme, FDA may approve a
generic cefuroxime axetil tablet product whose labeling states that the
active ingredient is wholly or partially in crystalline form."
75
170 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 10-11 ("Because patents to nonapproved conditions
were not to be listed in the Orange Book, FDA appeared willing to accept the rationale
that generics could omit language from pioneer drug labels protected by claims of
patents that were not eligible for listing, and, hence, not subject to the generic certifi-
cation requirement.").
171 See Decision Letter from Dennis Baker, Assoc. Comm'r for Regulatory Affairs,
FDA, to Donald 0. Beers et al., at 1 (Feb. 15, 2002) (responding to citizen petitions
and petitions for stay of action that requested FDA denial of approval of any ANDA for
wholly or partially crystalline generic cefuroxime axetil).
172 Id. at 17.
173 Id.
174 Id. (emphasis added).
75 Id. at 18.
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The FDA approved the labeling change even though the Orange
Book does not list patents covering cefuroxime axetil. Cefuroxime
axetil is an old antibiotic, so patents claiming the drug and its meth-
ods of use are ineligible for Orange Book-listing. 176 The agency recog-
nized that the Orange Book did not contain cefuroxime axetil patents,
but this fact did not inhibit the agency from delving into the safety
and efficacy of generic cefuroxime axetil (in step two of its current
patent carve-out inquiry). The agency ultimately found the crystalline
form as safe and effective as the amorphous form of the drug and
consequently approved the patent carve-out. 
17
Interestingly, the FDA never explicitly invoked the patent carve-
out exception, though that is exactly what the agency approved.
Rather, the FDA acknowledged that the different manufacturer ex-
ception extended beyond its own list of examples:
The plain language of § 314.94(a) (8) (iv) explicitly recognizes that
these differences listed in the regulation are examples; therefore,
§ 314.94(a) (8) (iv) recognizes that there are other differences in labeling
between generic drug products and reference listed drugs that are per-
missible due to the fact that the generic drug product and reference
listed drug product are produced or distributed by different manufac-
178
turers.
The FDA did not categorize the requested labeling change as a patent
carve-out request, even though the generics effectively "designed
around" the pioneer's patents on the physical form of the drug. The
agency focused on the safety and efficacy of the generic drug and ap-
proved an omission of language protected by patents not listed in the
Orange Book.
What exactly motivated the FDA to add the Orange Book as a gate-
keeper to the patent carve-out exception is unknown. At least until
2002, the FDA seemed to support a fairly broad interpretation of the
patent carve-out exception. The change in its treatment of carve-out
requests likely derives from the agency's refusal to engage in patent
176 The FDA originally approved GSK's Ceftin on December 28, 1987. See
Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/
cder/drugsatfda (type in Ceftin; then follow Ceftin NDA #050605 hyperlink) (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2007). When discussing certification requirements in response to the PDI
Petition, however, the agency did note that GSK's "patent was not required to be listed
in the Orange Book because cefuroxime axetil is an antibiotic drug that was approved
under section 507 of the Act." Decision Letter from Dennis Baker, supra note 171, at
31.
177 See Decision Letter from Dennis Baker, supra note 171, at 7-16.
178 Id. at 18.
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review.179 Rather than reviewing patents to determine whether a pat-
ent's scope covers labeling language, the FDA decided to use the pat-
ent's Orange Book status as the threshold to the safety and efficacy in-
quiry. As discussed below,18 a compromise may be had where the
FDA need not engage in additional patent review, and the patent
carve-out exception can extend to patents not listed in the Orange
Book.
D. Judicial Constructions
No court decision to date specifically addresses the scope of the
patent carve-out exception. A number of cases, however, discuss the
FDA's authority to extend exceptions to the identical labeling re-
quirement. The majority of these cases involve an ANDA submitted
for an unprotected indication, where the applicant proposed labeling
instructions omitting language pertaining to a protected indication.
An analysis of each court's language in these cases suggests that the
court supports a broad scope for the carve-out exception generally.
BMS is the earliest case addressing the FDA's authority to approve
ANDAs even though the label of the generic drug would not include
an indication that appears on the label of the pioneer drug. In BMS,
the court interpreted labeling requirements of the Hatch-Waxman
Act: "[T]he statute expresses the legislature's concern that the new
generic be safe and effective for each indication that will appear on its
label; whether the label for the new generic lists every indication ap-
proved for use of the pioneer is a matter of indifference."' 8 ' First, the
court interprets the statute to say expressly that the touchstone of the
identical labeling requirement is the safety and efficacy of the drug in
the context of its own label. Second, the court notes that the differ-
ence in the number of indications between the pioneer and generic
drug labels is a "matter of indifference." The generic drug manufac-
turer should be free to choose which indications to promote, and the
specific nature of those differences is not relevant to the analysis. Ac-
cording to BMS, Hatch-Waxman does not concern itself with the omit-
179 See supra Parts I.C (discussing the FDA's ministerial role in the Orange Book list-
ing) and L.D (describing the FDA's substitution of use codes for its own review of the
patent and labeling sought to be carved out).
180 See infra Part IV (providing a possible compromise between the generics and
the FDA).
181 Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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ted language, because the focus of the exception is on the informa-
tion provided on the label.
Extending this logic to patent carve-outs, the FDA should not con-
centrate on the source of the omitted, protected information.
Whether the omitted information derives from a listed or unlisted
patent is irrelevant. So long as the generic drug label does not render
the drug less safe or effective than the pioneer drug, the generic
should satisfy Hatch-Waxman's (and consequently the FDA's) labeling
requirements. The Orange Book restriction is arguably contrary to the
BMS court's interpretation of Hatch-Waxman. If so, under a Chevron
analysis, the FDA may be stepping out of bounds by departing from
the BMS court's interpretation of exceptions to the identical labeling
requirement.
A broad view of the same labeling requirement was also supported
in Zeneca v. Shalala. 18 Zeneca had challenged the FDA's decision to
allow Genesia to add a sulfite warning on the label of its generic prod-
184uct. Zeneca urged the court to narrowly interpret the labeling ex-
ception, but the court declined to do so, citing BMS. s5 The Zeneca
court noted the importance of "harmony" among the different provi-
sions: "Given that a generic manufacturer is permitted to substitute
certain inactive ingredients .... it follows that these different ingredi-
ents must be identified in the labeling."
8 6
Applying Zeneca's reasoning to the patent carve-out exception, the
FDA's Orange Book limitation may not be in "harmony" with other pro-
visions. The "other aspect of labeling protected by patent" language is
basically superfluous 18 7 if it is limited to the Orange Book-listed patents,
because the Orange Book primarily lists patents claiming the drug itself
or indications. The FDA provides a specific labeling exception for
182 See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984). Without explicitly saying so, the D.C. Circuit in BMS, ruled under the first step
of the Chevron analysis. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 91 F.3d at 1499.
183 See Zeneca, Inc. v. Shalala, No. CIV.A. WNMN-99-307, 1999 WL 728104, at *12
(D. Md. Aug. 11, 1999) (holding that the FDA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
approving an ANDA for a generic drug whose labeling differed from that of the pio-
neer drug).
184 Id. at *10.
185 See id. ("[T]he Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit took a
much broader view of the same labeling requirement.").
186 Id. at 11.
187 Besides being superfluous, this severe limitation on the meaning of "other as-
pect of labeling" is also contrary to the FDA's purpose in adding the language. See su-
pra notes 167 to 170 and accompanying text (discussing the comment in the adminis-
trative record that motivated the FDA to add the "other aspect of labeling" provision).
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"omission of an indication," and generics do not submit ANDAs until
the drug patents expire. Extending the exception to "other aspect[s]
of labeling protected by patent" provides no additional protection.
To harmonize the "other aspect of labeling" provision with the Orange
Book listing requirements, the FDA should extend the exception
broadly to labeling changes due to different manufacturers, as BMS
and Zeneca suggest.
The assumption that the Orange Book should contain all patents
that would be subject to a bona fide carve-out request is flawed, and
case law suggests such an assumption will not fare well in courts. In
Purepac, the FDA denied an ANDA for a generic drug based on an im-
properly listed patent. 8s The FDA argued that the Orange Book
"should" only contain patents claiming approved uses, and that as-
sumption somehow absolved the agency of the responsibility of re-
viewing a patent that the ANDA applicant contended did not belong
in the Orange Book.IS9 The court criticized the FDA for using its con-
struction of a "legal fiction" to ignore crucial facts' 90 and found that
the FDA's decision violated the APA.' 9' An assertion by the FDA that
old antibiotics would be in the Orange Book but for Congress will
probably not excuse its denial of carve-out requests from ANDA appli-
cants of old antibiotics. The reasoning from Purepac implies that
courts will not tolerate the FDA's assumption that the Orange Book
necessarily contains the types of patents that would comprise bona
fide carve-out requests.
Another case worth discussing-not for its discussion of labeling,
but for its underlying proposition-is Warner-Lambert.192 The central
question in Warner-Lambert was whether submitting an ANDA seeking
approval to make, use, or sell a drug for an approved use was an act of
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2) (a) if any other use of the
188 Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 208 (D.D.C. 2002),
affd, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The FDA improperly listed Pfizer's '479 patent
covering gabapentin's unapproved use for treating neurodegenerative diseases in the
Orange Book, and then denied Purepac's ANDA for gabapentin to treat epilepsy-the
approved use-because only approved method-of-use patents may be listed in the Or-
ange Book Id.
Id.
'90 Id.
191 Id. at 212.
192 See Warner Lambert, Inc. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding that "it is not an act of infringement to submit an ANDA for approval
to market a drug for a use when neither the drug nor that use is covered by an existing
patent, and the patent at issue is for a use not approved under the NDA").
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drug is claimed in a patent, or, in the alternative, if "it is only an act of
infringement to submit an ANDA seeking approval to make, use, or
sell a drug if the drug or the use for which FDA approval is sought is
claimed in a patent.' ' 93 Warner-Lambert asserted that "a patent claim-
ing a use of a drug is infringed by the filing of an ANDA irrespective
of whether approval is sought to market the drug for the patented
use."' 94 The Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court engaged in statu-
tory interpretation and found that "Congress intended to draw a dis-
tinction in the Act between those indications for which an ANDA ap-
plicant is seeking approval and those for which it is not when
determining if certification is necessary."' 95 Warner-Lambert therefore
stands for the proposition that an ANDA applicant need not file a
paragraph certification for that which it is not asserting.
The logic behind Warner-Lambert holds significance in the patent
carve-out context. When an ANDA applicant seeks to carve out pro-
tected language from a label, the applicant is not seeking FDA ap-
proval to make, use, or sell the drug as described in the omitted lan-
guage. Therefore, the ANDA applicant should not have to certify that
a listed patent protects the omitted language. According to Warner-
Lambert, Apotex did not have to certify that patents covering the omit-
ted indications either were not filed, were expired, will expire, or were
not infringed, because Apotex did not seek FDA approval for the
omitted indications. Similarly, an ANDA applicant should not have to
certify that the Orange Book lists patents covering omitted language
when the applicant does not seek FDA approval for the omitted lan-
guage. Limiting generics to language omissions protected by listed
patents essentially restricts generics to language omissions that are
subject to generic certification requirements. Applying Warner-
Lambert, generics should not be required to certify patented language
that they seek to omit.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A couple of solutions have been proposed to guide the FDA in
finding the appropriate scope of the patent carve-out exception. The
generics, unsurprisingly, call for a broad carve-out policy that encom-
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1355.
195 Id. at 1361.
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passes all patents, irrespective of the Orange Book listings. 196 Such an
unfettered policy does not address what is perceived to be the
agency's concern about patent review: the FDA has made it clear that
it does not want to review patents.' 9' Presumably, the FDA's desire to
maintain its ministerial role drives the agency to limit patent carve-
outs to the Orange Book. As long as the generics request carve-outs
based on language protected by patent, there has to be some verifica-
tion process to determine if that language is indeed protected. Cur-
rently, the FDA has assumed the responsibility, in a way, by limiting
the patent carve-out to the agency-compiled Orange Book. The FDA
assumes that the language is protected because the language derives
from an Orange Book-listed patent.
A solution that better balances the proper scope of the carve-out
exception with the responsibilities of the FDA is to require the ANDA
or section 505(b) (2) applicant to profess, under penalty of peijury, its
belief that the language is claimed by a patent, listed or unlisted. This
approach is consistent with the FDA's implementation of a number of
Hatch-Waxman Act provisions. The FDA's policies frequently place
the onus on the NDA holder to reasonably abide by the regulations.
One example is the submission of the use code. Another example is
the submissions to the Orange Book. Part of the FDA's motivation in
placing the burden on the applicants is convenience, but another part
also presumably derives from its trust in the system. For those same
reasons, the FDA should seriously consider placing the onus of
unlisted patent carve-out requests on the applicant. The potential
abuses of the system are no different than those available to the pio-
neers in the use code and Orange Book listing context.
A second suggestion proposed by generics requires pioneers to
disclose relevant patents when amending labels. The FDA can then
make a judgment call as to whether the label updates are genuinely
196 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 11 ("A solution proposed by generics is for FDA to
broaden the agency's carve-out policy to encompass all patents, whether or not listed
in the Orange Book, thereby removing the incentive for pioneers to game the Orange
Book.").
197 See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Pro-
visions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,345 (Oct. 3, 1994) ("FDA does not have the resources
or the expertise to review patent information for its accuracy and relevance to an
NDA."); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872, 28,909
(proposed July 10, 1989) ("Because the FDA has no expertise in the field of patents,
the agency has no basis for determining whether a use patent covers the use sought by
the generic applicant.").
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for consumer health or for competitive gain."" This suggestion is
good, but incomplete. The agency would initially use the patent sub-
missions as a red flag, but what standard would the FDA apply in ac-
cepting or denying the label amendments? From the FDA's stand-
point, this suggestion has two undesirable attributes. First, in order to
assess whether the amendments are designed to extend exclusivity or
for consumer health, the FDA would have to engage in the review of
patents listed or unlisted in the Orange Book. Second, the agency's
workload would increase in amount and difficulty if the FDA had to
inquire into the purpose of the amendments and the intent of the
NDA holders.
Perhaps a better way to stop NDA holders from updating the label
to inhibit generics from entering the marketplace is to limit drug label
updates to those that improve the safety and efficacy of the drug. In
addition to requiring NDA holders to submit relevant patents, the
FDA can require that any request for label amendments be a "good
faith" assertion that those amendments are more than incremental
improvements that need to be communicated to doctors and patients.
That way, when the generic submits an ANDA with language carved
out, the generic must rebut the presumption that the language is nec-
essary for the safety and efficacy of the drug. This approach front-
loads the determination of safety and efficacy onto the NDA holders
and may slightly increase the FDA's workload when pioneers request
labeling amendments.
Yet the FDA's presumption of necessity may result in less work
overall. This good faith approach may discourage NDA holders from
submitting updates that fail to provide more than incremental im-
provements to the drug's safety and efficacy. Furthermore, generics
will only challenge the presumption when they can make a particu-
larly strong showing that the language omission does not affect safety
and efficacy. Finally, the good faith approach focuses the FDA on the
proper inquiry for the agency-the safety and efficacy of the drug in
light of the labeling change-and excludes patent review, which is
outside the agency's expertise.
This good faith approach to labeling amendments would require
the FDA to change its philosophy toward labeling changes, which
'9' See Mahn, supra note 1, at 11-12 ("Another suggestion is to require pioneers to
disclose whether patents protect labeling changes or pending applications-much like
most standards organizations now require-so FDA can make informed decisions as to
whether the amendments are for competitive gain or for consumer health.").
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could benefit the FDA and the public in other ways as well. Currently,
the FDA includes updates to labeling information liberally, with the
idea that more is better. Product inserts are already long and cumber-
some for doctors and patients to read, and changes in labels often-
times lead to consumer confusion. Limiting the insert to updates that
are truly important to the safety and efficacy of the drug may lessen
consumer confusion and better highlight the important information,
while potentially reducing the workload of the FDA.
The utility of both of these suggestions hinges on the threat of
real penalties. According to these proposals, ANDA applicants will
have to swear under penalty of perjury that they are omitting language
deriving from a patent, and NDA holders must submit in good faith
that the labeling amendments improve the safety and efficacy of the
drug to an extent that warrants notification to the consumer. The
penalty of perjury, in combination with other measures, has report-
edly quashed Orange Book ever-greening.'99 The success of this penalty
in the Orange Book context should make the FDA feel comfortable re-
quiring a similar declaration from generics in the patent carve-out
context.
A good faith requirement is much more difficult to enforce be-
cause NDA holders can always argue that they believe the label change
to be more than an incremental improvement. Yet, the good faith
approach rightfully places the time delay in the administrative process
for the safety and efficacy determination on the NDA holder instead
of the generic. The NDA holder will need to be more cautious about
submitting labeling amendments under the good faith requirement,
and the FDA may need to spend more time scrutinizing the labeling
updates and relevant patents before making a determination.
If the FDA continues to restrict the patent carve-out exception to
the Orange Book, then the agency should, at the very least, subject NDA
holders to real penalties if they fail to list patents in the Orange Book.
Pioneers are likely to withhold patents from the Orange Book so that
the agency cannot approve proposed carve-outs. 200 The Orange Book
restriction creates incentives for pioneers to exclude patents from the
199 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
2W See Mahn, supra note 1, at 11 (" [P] ioneers have a strong incentive to opt out of
the Orange Book in order to eliminate the carve out option and force generics to amend
their labels with infringing language.").
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Orange Book without much of a loss. 21 As mentioned above, the with-
drawal of FDA approval is the only current penalty for withholding• •202
patents, and such a "draconian" penalty is not likely to be employed.
In anticipation of future abuses, the FDA should set up a mecha-
nism whereby a generic can challenge the pioneer's failure to submit
to the FDA a patent for inclusion in the Orange Book. Once the pio-
neer receives notice, the FDA can set a time frame during which the
pioneer should respond. After looking at the complaint and re-
sponse, the FDA should make a ruling as to whether the patent should
be submitted. If the FDA finds that the patent qualified for Orange
Book listing, then the FDA can impose a fine (or whatever other pen-
alty the agency deems fit) upon the pioneer for withholding the pat-
ent. While this mechanism does require the FDA to engage in some
patent review, the level of review is no more intensive than the analysis
2013the FDA already performs for Orange Book submissions.
The FDA should return to interpreting the patent carve-out ex-
ception broadly, while staying removed from the patent arena. By re-
quiring ANDA applicants to declare, under penalty of perjury, that the
information they seek to carve out is protected under patent, the FDA
can focus on the central inquiry of the safety and efficacy of the drug
in the context of its label. By implementing a good faith requirement
to label updates, the FDA will discourage label updates unnecessary to
doctors and patients. Fewer label changes also means fewer carve-out
requests. Further, instituting a mechanism to challenge the absence
of patents from the Orange Book should keep the Orange Book listing up
to date. These provisions acting in concert will hopefully return the
patent carve-out exception to the broad scope intended by Congress.
CONCLUSION
The inherent assumption of the FDA's Orange Book limitation is
that all of the desirable carve-outs will derive from patents listed in the
Orange Book. In the words of the Purepac court, "it is simply misguided
201 See id. at 12 n.26 ("Once ANDAs are on file with FDA, no 30-month stay is avail-
able for new patent listings, decreasing the incentive to file new patents in the Orange
Book.").
202 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
203 See Mahn, supra note 1, at 12 n.20 ("FDA already engages in a rudimentary pat-
ent analysis when reviewing and verifying that an NDA applicant has correctly certified
a patent for listing in the Orange Book (see 21 C.F.R. § 314.53), and when reviewing a
generic applicant's Paragraph IV certification and/or Section viii statements in view of
patent claims and label language.").
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to suggest that this situation must actually exist merely because it is
supposed to exist. 20 4 And the situation does not exist. The FDA
probably based its current framework for evaluating a patent carve-
out on its experience with requests to omit a patented use of a
drug, which should be listed in the Orange Book, from a generic la-
bel. This restriction ignores two facts: (1) "other aspect[s] of la-
beling protected by patent" are not necessarily in the Orange Book
and (2) Congress may have reasons unrelated to the patent carve-
out exception for designating certain patents ineligible for the Or-
ange Book. 
205
The FDA should recognize the legitimacy of carve-outs based on
unlisted patents in at least two scenarios-old antibiotics and biologi-
cal products. The FDA is currently reevaluating its policy toward old
antibiotics. 2°6 The agency likely already recognizes the unfortunate
situation of generics submitting ANDAs for old antibiotics, since it ap-
proved a patent carve-out request for an old antibiotic before its adop-• • 207
tion of the Orange Book restriction. Therefore, the new policy to-
ward old antibiotics may not subject this category of drugs to the
Orange Book restriction.
The FDA's policy toward biological generics has only just begun.
Patents on many of the first biological products (e.g., interferons, in-
terleukins, and erythropoietin) are beginning to expire, 20" and Con-
gress will likely create a mechanism for approval of biological generics
during the next few years. '  Having seen the effect of the Orange Book
restriction on at least one potential biological generic (enoxaparin)
will hopefully inform the FDA's patent carve-out policy for biological
generics.
The unintended consequences of a narrow interpretation of the
patent carve-out are only part of the reason that the FDA should
204 Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 208 (D.D.C. 2002),
affd, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
205 See supra Part I.A (discussing Congress's decision not to list old antibiotics in
the Orange Book).
206 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
207 See supra Part II.C (discussing the approval of the old antibiotic cefuroxime
axetil).
20 See Heidi Ledford, The Same but Different, 449 NATURE 274, 276 tbl. (2007) (cata-
loguing the patent expiration dates of prominent biologic drugs).
209 See Congressional Fix for Follow-On Biologics Unlikely Until 2008, WASH. DRUG LET-
TER, June 26, 2006, at 26 (reporting that, according to one Senate staffer, legislative
proposals amending the FDCA will be entertained in 2008); see also Senate Advances Bio-
generics Bill, supra note 138, at 20 (discussing proposed bills).
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strongly consider reevaluating its policy. The Orange Book limitation is
not clearly supported by the text or legislative history of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the FDA's own regulations and decisions, or the courts'
opinions relating to exceptions to the labeling requirement.
The FDA probably decided to limit patent carve-outs to those
listed in the Orange Book to avoid patent review, but the FDA need not
engage in further patent analysis to maintain the appropriate breadth
of the patent carve-out exception. The FDA should place the burden
on the ANDA or section 505(b) (2) applicant to identify the patents
and declare, under penalty of perjury, that those patents protect the
carved-out language. The generic will likely bear the responsibility
gladly in exchange for FDA consideration of its patent carve-out un-
der the safety and efficacy standard.
